Abstract
They make sure that their vote counts, as opposed to being merely counted by casting a sincere vote. Even a small nurnber of strategic voters in PR systems might have a !arge impact on the election outcome in thelr electoral district, though. Moreover, a small number of voters might also determine the fate of a particular coalition government. Over time, strategic voting might also cause small parties to eventually fall by the wayside. Thus studying strategic voting seems to be a priori relevant for the study of party systems and its consolidation even in PR systems such as in Portugal.
The incentive structure
What are the incentives that the elect:oral systems provide to voters to deviate from their most preferred party? In general, in PR systems even marginal parties have chances to gain seats and to represent the opinions of thelr voters. Therefore, such an electoral system does not provide strong incentives for marginal party supporters to cast a strategic vote. The comparative literature on electoral systems argues, going back at least to Leys ( 19 5 9) and Sartoti (1968) , that the smaller the disttict magnitude is-that is, the fewer seats are awarded at the elect:oral disttict level-the stronger the incentives to vote strategically. Although this hypothesis is developed to asses the incentives across a vatiety of electoral systems, it should also apply to electoral systems that do not award the same nurnber of seats at every electoral system.
The electoral institutions in Portugal are particularly interesting in that regard. Since 1975 the range ofthe disttict magnitude has been rather wide. Across all 20 electoral districts and all elections between 1975 and 2002 the disttict magnitude ranges from a minimurn of three (Portalegre since 1985, Beja since 1999 and Evora since 2002) to a maximum of 58 (Lisbon in 19 76) . Given the Leys-Sartori conjecture is supported. we should expect to fmd more strategic voting the smaller the district magnitude. Nevertheless, the literature claims that strategic voting supposedly fades out when disttict magnitude is greater than five because the informational requirements for voters become too high in order to realise the incentives that are provided in districts with a !arge district magnitude (Cox 1997: 100;  Cox and Shugart 1996; Sartori 1968: 2 79) . Simply pul, it is (too) difficult for voters to figure out which party is marginal. Thus they cannot systematically try to avoid wasting their vote. Evidence to support this claim is stemming from japanese and Colombian district-level results (Cox 1997: Chapter 5, Cox and Shugart 1996) as weil as electoral returns in Spanish distticts (Cox 1997 : 115-117, Gunther 1989 . At first sight, this argument seems plausible. Nevertheless the question, then, is, why forming expectations suddenly becomes so difficult that, according to this line of reasoning, one expects some strategic voting in districts with magnitude four but no langer in districts with district magnitude six and higher.
My argument will be that the literature does not provide sufficiently solid microfoundations for macro-level relationships between electoral system characteristics and implications of the nature of party systems, such as conditions under which certain parties are strategically deserted.
To understand the influence of institutional iucentives that are at work, one has to look more closely at the decision-making process of voters.
Micro-foundation and the role of expectations
Following the wasted-vote logic, strategic voters in Portugal vote for another party than their most preferred one if they thus expect it to be more likely to influence the outcome of the race in their electoral district. Thus, besides party preferences the main factor that proves to be important for an individual's decision-making process are subjective expectations-whether a vote for someone's most preferred party will be wasted. If we are willing to assume that voters try to maximise their expected utility from voting then we can conceptualise the expected utility in the following way: every voter derives a higher utility from voting for a particular party the more this party is preferred over any other party, assuming that this party gains a seat in the voter's electoral district in the first place. However, without gaining any seat in the voter's electoral district, the utility derived from a wasted vote for this party will be much smaller-or even zero-if the voter is not expressively motivated. 1 Since not all parties will necessarily gain a seat in the voter's electoral district, the additional utility a voter derives from voting for a party that gains a seat in the voter' s electoral district is uncertain. Thus the expected utility a voter derives from voting for a party is the product of the utility, given that this party will gain at least a seat in the voter's electoral district, weighted by the voter's expectation that this party will actually gain at least a seat.
How do voters form these expectations? There are at least two conceivable processes: on the one hand, independent of which party is most preferred, the !arger the district magnitude the lower the threshold for any party to gain seats and thus the higher their supporters expectation that their vote will not be wasted (Sartori 1968: 279 )-consequently, voters should be more aware that they potentially waste their vote in smaller districts than in !arger districts because parties, and the media are more likely to highlight this effect in smaller than in !arger districts.
On the other hand, independent of the district magnitude of voters' electoral district, even inattentive voters -as 'cognitive misers' (Fiske and Taylor 1991) -are likely to employ heuristics, such as the electoral history heuristic (Gschwend 2004) to generate reasonable expectations whether their most preferred party is able to win a seat in their electoral district. Although the process of expectation formation is unobservable, this heuristic implies that voters' expectation whether their most preferred party will gain a seat in their electoral district in the upcoming election should be much higher if this party has previously gained a seat in this district. The consequences of employing this heuristic to generate expectations are independent from characteristics of the electoral district. lt should not be harder for voters in Lisbon (!arge district) than for voters in Beja (small district), since they only care about the prospects of their most preferred party. Thus, contrary to the reasoning in the literature (Cox and Institutional incentives for strategic voting and party system change in Portugal 17 Shugart 1996: 311; Cox 1997: 100), voters might even cast a strategic vote in !arge districts. given that they expect their most preferred party not to gain representation in their electoral district. To sum up, there is a process at the district level, which characterises the nature of the district race. The potential for any vote to be wasted is a priori higher in smaller districts than in !arger ones. Thus, political parties and the media should be all the more motivated to malre voters aware of the wastedvote context in smaller districts. Thus, this process facilitates voters to form clear expectations. Although the average voter might be more aware of the possibility to waste their vote, there is a second process at the individuallevel. Voters have to asses whether their most preferred party will gain a seat in their electoral district in the upcoming election. Since both processes operate at different levels simultaneously. they presumably interact.
Because these processes are unobservable, I will focus on their observable implications at the district-level in order to derive hypotheses about their consequences for what is politically relevant: party vote shares and ultimately, party system change. If voters expect their most preferred party to gain no seat, they should desert this party and vote strategically for another party in order to avoid wasting their vote. 
Party vote shares and strategic voting
Since I traced observable implications of the unobservable expectation formation process to the district-level to predict party vote shares, I will use district level results for all parties from 1975-2002 in order to test my hypotheses (see Table 1 ).
Following the presumed logic laid out previously, voters can only form expectations about the possibility that their vote might be wasted if the party they prefer has contested the same electoral district in the previous election. Thus, my theory cannot predict party vote shares for the first election a party does contest a particnlar electoral district. Nevertheless. I will end up with N = 14 77 cases of parties contesting one of 20 electoral districts. Even a party's election result of the first time it contests a particular district is relevant in two ways for my analysis, though.
First, what would happen if voters do not care about forming expectation and try to avoid wasting their votes? They simply cast their votes for the party they favour most. The observational implication of this at the 1975 1976 1979 1980 1983 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999 Institutional incentives for strategic voting and party system change in Portugaldistrict level would be that party vote shares are predictable by past performances in that district. Thus, I take a party's previous vote share in a given district as a measure of the normal vote baseline (NORMAL VOTE) a party could reasonably expect. Such a measure of the latent Ievel of sincere party support is necessary to not falsely overestimate the effect of strategic voting for (or against) a party in a given district. At the same time, it is a very conservative measure since it assumes that everybody voted sincerely the previous time. This measure, therefore, potentially underestimates the number of strategic votes.
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Second, in order to form an expectation of whether a vote for the most preferred party is wasted, a typical voter following the electoral history heuristic will look back at the previous election result: how many seats did a party get previouslyl The voter will be more likely to cast a strategic vote if their most preferred party did not get any seat the last time in a given district. Thus, in order to test the hypothesis that parties expected to be in danger of not winning representation should get deserted by strategic voters, we include a dummy variable (EXPECTATION) that scores 'l' in a given district if a party had gained no seat in the previous election in that district. The distribution of this variable across parties is shown in Table 2 .
There is considerable variance across parties. Apart from the 18 districts the AD did contest in 1980, all parties in Portugal have at least once contested an electoral district without winning a single seat there before. Parties in such districts are Iikely to be strategically deserted at the next election by some of their supporters because they expect their vote to be wasted. Conversely, there are apparently several parties who have never managed to win even a single seat in an electoral district. The support of these parties should diminish over time, or their supporters derive a particular high utility based on either expressive motifs or to secure side-benefits (such as financial compensation), from wasting their vote on these parties.
Tu lest the second hypothesis that parties in <langer of not winning representation perform worse while parties who are expected to gain seats should benefit from strategic voting, the smaller the district magnitude is, one has to account for the size of the district magnitude (M) in the model. lt is likely that the marginal impact of district magnitude M on party vote shares at the district level diminishes if M gets !arger (Monroe and Rose 2002; Taagepera and Shugart 1989) . Therefore, r logistically transform the district magnitude (log(M)) to account for that. To test for the condltionality of the hypothesised strategic desertion effect a product term with EXPEGI'ATION will be necessary.
Finally, I also include time flxed-effects (YEARS) into the model since I will combine party vote shares from all elections to be as encompassing as possible and, at the same time, without violating the unit homogeneity assumption for pooling data.
The standard dependent variable in the literature, the effective number of parties, as an aggregate measure of the nature of district party competition, Tab/e 3: Strategiedesertion of party vote shares. Table 3 shows the estimation OLS estimation results. All standard errors are clustered by party and eleetoral distriet to aeeount for the non-independence in the data strueture.
To evaluate the uneonditional effeet of expeetations on the amount of Strategie desertion of parties I first present the results of a restrieted model, excluding the eharaeteristies of the district magnitude. Not surprisingly, there is some kind of eontinuity when predieting a party's vote share at the distriet level. At the eleetoral distriet Ievel, apparently the strength of a party in the previous eleetion is a reliable predietor of future election results. On average a given party ean rely on almost 90 per cent of its previous support for the next eleetion.
Moreover, as expeeted the eoeffieient of EXPECTATION is negative. This indicates that parties in distriets where they have not won any seat in the previous eleetion are predieted to loose on average almost 3 per cent compared to those districts where their voters could expeet the party to gain representation. Every party has die-hard supporters. Nevertheless above and beyond the normal vote baseline, these results indieate that on average three out of 100 of a party's potential supporters behave strategieally and desert their party if they expect their vote to be wasted.
The Impact of strategie voting is also conditional on the size of the electoral distriet. The estimation result of the full model does make transparent the empirical evidence to support this claim. As expeeted, the interaction effect of EXPECTATION and district magnitude is significant. Thus the strategic desertion effect depends on the magnitude of the electoral district. To make transparent the conditionality and the size of this effect 1 calculate the causal effect of EXPECTATION depending on the district magnitude, as the difference of the predicted vote shares in a given electoral district a party has to expect if it failed to gain a seat in the previous election as compared to a situation where this party did gain a seat in the previous election, that is
Figure 1 makes transparent the conditionality of the strategic voting effect. The area between the 95 per cent-confidenee intervals is shaded.
In Portugal' s smallest electoral districts we fmd that more than four out of 100 supporters of any given party desert this party if they expect their votes to be wasted. The share of strategie voters for any given party will diminish the !arger the distriet magnitude gets. Nevertheless, even in Lisbon, the largest electoral district in Portugal with a district magnitude of 48 (at the moment), the model will predict a small but systematic share of voters to east a strategie vote.
Therefore, contrary to previous studies. there is conclusive evidence that there is some systematic strategic voting at the electoral district-level. Some Portuguese voters apparently try to avoid wasting their votes on small parties that are not expected to gain at least a seat in the voters' eleetoral distrtct. The systematic desertion of small parties at the electoral district is a proposed individual-level mechanism. The consequences of this mechanism for party system change at the macro-level will be discussed in the next section.
Institutional incentives for strategic voting and party system change in PortugalParty system change and strategic voting
What are the eonsequenees of strategie voting for the party system in Portugal? While the first democratie eleetions in Portugal have seen a rather fragmented party system aeeompanied with high eabinet lnstability, various observers agree that sinee 1987 there has been a majoritarian trend in the Portuguese party system since 19 8 7 along with inereasingly stable governments (Lobo 2001 , Magone 1999 , Fretre 2006 , Magalhäes 2003 . At first sight. institutional effeets eannot explain this trend. As the eleetoral system has not ehanged mueh. Moreover, the electoral districts remained the same although the respeetive district magnitudes varied slightly over time. The size of parliament shrunk from 250 seats to 230 (since 1991). Thus, given the stability ofthe institutional context, no !arge 'mechanieal' effect is to be expeeted that may explain this majoritarian trend. Nevertheless. strategie voting-as this paper argues-erueially depends on 'psyehological' effeets: !hat is, how voters form expectations about the outcome of an eleetion. In order to help produeing a majoritarian trend, instrumental voters need to perceive the same parties as viable and, at the same time, expect their most preferred party to have little prospeet of gaining representation or becoming part of the next government. Instead of wasting their votes on their most preferred party, instrumentally motivated voters try to make their vote eount and east a vote strategieally for a less preferred but viable party. Thus, if strategic voting has the potential to at least partly explain why, sinee 1987, fewer parties earn more votes and small parties eventually winnow out, voters need to form similar expeetations of which parties will gain seats in their district or who will be likely to be part of the next government. Using districtlevel data does not allow addressing this without making !arge assumptions. This should be done with individual-level data. The question whether voters strategieally try to avoid wasting their vote are more likely to influence the race in their electoral district has been addressed above.
Although voters are apparently more likely to expeet their votes to be wasted the smaller the magnitude is in thetr electoral district, the difference between !arge and small magnitudes is less interesting than the effect of expeetations itself. Thus, in the following seetion I will focus on the effect of ExPECTATION at the district level: that is, the effect that parties whieh bad gained no seat in the previous election will loose votes in the subsequent election. The proposed underlying mechanism generating this effect is that voters expeet those parties to unable to win a seat in their eleetoral district. A first indieation that strategic voting could be a eandidate to explain why there has been a majoritarian trend in the Portuguese party system since 1978, the effect of ExPECTATION Table 4 shows the OLS estimation results. All standard errors are clustered by party and electoral distriet to aeeount for the non-independence in the data strueture. Strategie voting seems to be of more importance in eleetions held sinee 19 8 7, while the role expeetations play for the vote shaies of parties that have not been able to win at least one seat in the previous election in a particular distriet is only marginally signifieant and small in absolute terms (about one percentage point) before 1987. Compared to eleetions up to 1985, the effeet o[ strategie voting inereases about 2.8 per eent. Since 19 8 7, averaged across all parties that have not been able to win at least one seat in the previous eleetion, one has to expeet that those parties be strategieally deserted by almost 4 per eent of their voters -ahnest four times the respeetive effeet in eleetions up to 1985.2 How ean this be explained? All politieal aetors have to learn how to most effeetively play the rules of the game defined by the eleetoral system. Parties might eonsider bargaining for particular pre-eleetoral eoalitions at the district-level if they have otherwise no chance of gaining a seat there. They can also fine-tune their campaigns-sending district-specific signals to their supporters. The media also has to learn how to cover interesting developments and light races at the district-level in addition to the campaign dynamics on the national scene. This way. the media can facilitate the formation of common voters' expectations for every electoral district in which party can be deserted and is expected to gain seats. Finally, voters themselves have to learn how to avoid wasting their votes and, in order to do that, need to form expectations about the likely outcome of the district race. Thus, parties, the media and voters have to learn the implications of the electoral rules-and this, presumably, takes a while. The more orten a party competes in an electoral district, the easier it should be for voters to form expectations whether or not a vote for this party is wasted. Although it might take a while (for instance, supporters of PCP took longer because of their strong social-structural anchoring (Gunther and Montero 2001: 141) than those supporting the CDS. Small party supporters eventually learn that their votes are going to be wasted if their most preferred party has little chance of gaining at least a seat in the electoral district. Thus, in general, 1 expect parties where voters had the opportunity to learn forming expectations about the parties' electoral success to be more strategically deserted
if those parties failed to gain representation in the previous election than in districts where voters did not have the opportunity to learnforming expectations.
To operationalise this learning process as an opportunity to form common expectations, indicated by the variable LEARNING, 1 simply count the number of elections a party has competed in a particular electoral district. The District Learning Hypothesis, then, is tested by also including the product term with ExPECTATION in the model. Consequently, I expect a significantly negative interaction term ExPECTATION X LEARNING.
Besides a district-specific learning effect that increases the substantive impact of strategic voting, the context of a particular parliamentary election might also facilitates strategic voting if voters can easier form expectations and distinguish parties that are able to win seats in an electoral district from those parties that do not. In presidential election years, the electoral context of a campaign should be different from other election years. Presidential elections are held as a two-round majoritarian system; consequently supporters of small parties will have to eventually vote for another candidate anyway, since their party's presidential candidate -if there is any -will have no chance to advance successfully to the second round of the election. For voters this can have two effects. First, some small party supporters might change their party preferences in favour of one of the main parties. This is not an unlikely scenario, particularly for many Portuguese voters given their relative weak ideological polarisation along the left-right cleavage compared to voters in other countries (Gunther and Montero 2001) . Second, and less drastically, even if voters do not change their party preferences, their expectation formation process might nevertheless be particularly . biased to reflect the strengths of parties at the national level rather than the strengths of parties on the district level, which is relevant for the distribution of parliamentary seats. The media may also systematically facilitate processes, since the focus of their presidential election campaign coverage and the commentators will be on the major parties' candidates making it particularly hard for small parties to stay on-message even in the coverage of the parliamentary election campaign. Under the pressure of a presidential election, parties might also be more likely to think harder about their local campaign strategies or be more likely to form pre-electoral coalitions with other parties on the same ideological aisle (Freire 2006; Lobo 2001) .
Given that presidential and parliamentary elections are held close together, the majoritarian tendency that is a concomitant phenomenon of a presidential election campaign shonld 'contaminate ' (Shngart and Carey 1992: 239-242 In those years, contamination should be greatest -no matter whether presidential or parliamentary elections are held first: the context through which voters form their expectations is contaminated in either case. The Contamination Hypothesis, then. is tested by also including the product term with Exl'ECTATION into the model. Consequently, I expect a significantly negative interaction term ExPFCfATION X CONTAMINATION.
Both hypotheses relate strategic voting to party system change because they enable voters to form common expectations at the district level of which parties will be able to galn seats and which might partially explain why fewer parties earn more votes and small parties even tually winnow out. If those hypothesised factors account completely for the increased importance of strategic voting since 198 7. then the interaction effect of ExPECTATION X CoNTAMINATION should no be longer significant. In order to estimate a full model, 1 simply add the variables needed to test those two additional hypotheses to the baseline model. Consequently the full model becomes: The OLS estimation results are presented in Table 4 . Again, all standard errors are clustered by party and electoral district to account for the nonindependence in the data structure.
Institutional incentives for strategic voting and party system change in Portugal No. of Elcctioos N"'4t,;Soeauio: 1m...i1a1er~u,~~o Table 4 makes transparent that strategic voting has at least some potential to explain why some parties will gain more votes over time while others winnow out. As expected, both hypothesised interaction effects are significantly negative. Since the substantive interpretation of the eonditional effeets is partieularly difficult I present the size of the estimated eausal effeet of strategie desertion, Y(EXPECTATION = 1) -Y(EXPBCTATION = O). based on the full model in Table 4 graphieally in Figure 2 . The area between the 9 5 per cent-confidence intervals is shaded.
The size of the eausal effect of strategic desertion defines the vertieal axes of all Cour panels in this figure-that is, the amount of strategie desertion averaged across all parties and all eleetoral distriets a party has to expeet if it failed to gain a seat in the previous election as compared to a situation where this party did gain a seat in the previous eleetion. The size of the easual effeet depends on the number of eleetions a party did compete in an electoral district (LEARNING) that defmes the horizontal axes ln all Cour panels. Based on the full model. Cour different scenarios have to be distinguished: whether one focuses on strategic voting since 198 7 or before 1987 {left versus right column). or whether one is interested in effects of strategic voting in 'eontaminated' versus other election years {upper versus lower row). Note that the number of eases differs across those Cour scenarios, and results are only presented if they actually occur ln the data set-for instanee, parties are able to compete in more successive elections at the district level sinee 19 8 7 than before.
In all Cour panels we can see the predieted upward trend, indieating that parties have to expeet a greater loss due to strategie desertion the 28 Thomas Gschwend morc oftcn thcy compete there. Thc slopc of those predicted scenarios is largest (in absolute terms) for observations in 1991 (i.e. observations in election years since 1987 in which presidential elections were also held). Based on these results, we would expect to see even stronger desertion of small parties if presidential and parliamentary elections were be held in the same year sometime in the future. Furthermore, the simulated results of the lower right panel make an interesting feature of the learning effect of strategie voting transparent. In elections before 19 8 7, where presidential elections were not held in the same year and if the number of eleetions a party eompetes is at most three, all respective 95 per eent-eonfidenee intervals include the 0 per cent-line. Thus, the strategie desertion effect apparently takes at least four suceessive elections before voters learn how to avoid wasting their votes. In the period since 198 7, as can be seen in the lower left panel, voters systematically desert hopeless parties in a given electoral district after the second successive competition.
To sum up, strategic voting even seems to have more impact on party vote shares sinee 1987. lt can partially explain why-particularly sinee 1987-fewer parties earn more votes and small parties eventually winnow out. Nevertheless, looking at the significant ExPECTATION X 198 7 AND LATER effect. neither proposed processes-a learning process at the electoral district level or a contamination effect. nor the eombination ofboth processes does fully aeeounts for the majoritarian trend since 1987.
Conclusion
Contrary to previons studies, I provide evidence for the case of Portugal that-despite weak institutional incentives-strategie voting is observable aeross all eleetoral distriets. These incentives coustrain an individual's decision-making proeess. The argument I developed here is that institutional incentives have an impact on the way voters form expectations about the outcome of upcoming elections. These incentives get ehanneled through the distriet: the situation in small districts is eonsequently different from !arge distriets. Nevertheless. there is also a second proeess at work that has an impact on the way voters form expeetations. Parties expeeted to be in <langer of not winning representation get punished by strategie desertion -less so the !arger the district magnitude is. Overall. the model predicts that almost 3 per cent of each party's vote share is lost due to strategie voting if voters do not expeet a party to win at least a single seat in !hat electoral district. This number is highest (over 4 per eent) in Portugal's smallest electoral districts. Nevertheless, in all existing eleetoral distriets the results indieate some non-trivial amount of loss due to strategie voting. Parties that are expected to win representation benefit from the strategie votes of those voters who try to avoid wasting their votes on their most preferred party. In this sense, these findings eeho results from a eomparable study on strategic voting using district-level data from Finland (Gsehwend and Stoiber 2005).
A major alternative argument to the one proposed here would be if the voters do not react strategically to the institutional incentives of the electoral system, but merely the party elltes. Strategie behaviour of parties is all the more Iikely if. on the one hand, there are strong party organisations frrmly anchored in Portuguese society and, on the other hand, if voting behaviour is easily predictable at the district level. While the Iatter seems to be the case given the high eoefficient of the normal vote_ baseline in the model, the former criteria seems not to hold. There is a proliferation of parties which come and go, rename themselves or coalesce with others. Clearly a more detailed study at the party level is needed in order to estimate the impact of strategic party behaviour. Nevertheless, the amount of strategie voting estimated here is a conservative since the strategie behaviour of party elltes-building pre-eleetoral coalitions in order to maximise their prospects of getting seats in a partieular district-does pre-empts strategic behaviour on side of the voters, sinee a vote for a pre-eleetoral coalition of parties is more likely not to be wasted.
Beside the theoretical interest in the evidenee of strategic voting, partieularly in an institutional eontext such as in Portugal, with !arge electoral districts, what is the impact of strategic voting for the party system? Particularly strilting is the majoritarian trend in the Portuguese party system since 1987. The results are eonsistent with predictions that are generated by two different meehanisms: on the one hand, small parties winnow out, particularly in electoral districts where voters had the opportunity to learn forming expectations about the parties' eleetoral suecess beeause the party is regularly eompeting there. On the other hand, small parties winnow out and get particularly hurt by contamination effeets associated with the majoritarian charaeter of the presidential electoral campaigns when parliamentary and presidential eleetions are held in the same year. Nevertheless, more research is needed, particularly through making creative use of survey data to better account for the majoritarian trend of the party system. Strategie voting has only some potential to partly explain the concentration of the party system in Portugal since 19 8 7.
